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Ordered into Oblivion: How Courts Have
Rendered the Georgia Whistleblower Act Useless,
and How to Fix It
Micah Barry*
ABSTRACT
In Georgia, the Georgia Whistleblower Act (“GWA”) protects public
employees who report unlawful activity. Recent court decisions have
reduced the GWA to a state of uselessness. Federal whistleblower law
provides useful insights on how the Georgia General Assembly can amend
the GWA to restore and enhance its effectiveness. This article details the
history of the GWA and recent court decisions. The article then examines
federal whistleblower law. Finally, it provides recommendations, including
draft amendment language.

I. INTRODUCTION
Whistleblowers—those who disclose illegal, immoral, or illegitimate
practices of their employers to those in a position to rectify those
practices—serve important functions in our society.1 By exposing illegal
actions, whistleblowers “expose, deter, and curtail wrongdoing.”2
Recognizing the importance of protecting whistleblowers, the federal
*

Principal, The Law Office of Micah Barry; Of Counsel, The Kirby G. Smith Law Firm,
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1
See Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and
Corporate Governance: Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility,
and Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 178 (2002).
2
See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 100 (2000).
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government and all fifty states have enacted whistleblower protection
statutes.3
In Georgia, public employees receive whistleblower protections from the
Georgia Whistleblower Act (“GWA”).4 Enacted in 1993, the GWA initially
only covered members of the Executive Branch of the state, excluding the
Governor’s Office, but it has since been expanded to cover all state and
local government employees in Georgia.5 As this article will show, recent
developments in case law under the GWA have drastically reduced the
whistleblower protections afforded to public employees in the state, and the
statute is due for an amendment.
Part II of this article will provide details of the GWA’s statutory
language and the state of the GWA prior to 2015. Part III will discuss recent
developments in GWA litigation, including updated case law and a trend
the author has personally seen in the course of litigating several cases under
the GWA. Part IV will examine the federal Whistleblower Protection Act
(“WPA”) and the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (“WPEA”).

3

See Robert G. Vaughn, State Whistleblower Status and the Future of Whistleblower
Protection Symposium: Whistleblower Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581, 581–83
(1999) (collecting statutes).
4
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4. Literature on the GWA is divided about what to call the statute, as
no title appears in the body of the act. Compare Seth Eisenberg, Public Officers and
Employees - General Provisions, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 309, 311 (2007) (referring to the
statute as the “Whistleblower Protection Act” and using the acronym “WPA”), with
Kimberly J. Doud, Recent Development: Public Employment Whistle-Blowers Act: North
Georgia Regional Educational Service Agency v. Weaver: 527 S.E.2d 864 (Ga. 2000), 30
STETSON L. REV. 1233, 1233–34 (2000) (referring to the statute as “Georgia’s
whistleblower statute”), and Murray-Obertein v. Georgia Gov’t Transparency and
Campaign Fin. Comm’n, 812 S.E.2d 28, 29 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (referring to the statute
as the “Georgia Whistleblower Act” and using the acronym “GWA”). The statute bears
the section title “Complaint or information from public employees as to fraud, waste, and
abuse in state programs and operations.” O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4. Within the practice area,
“Georgia Whistleblower Act” and “GWA” have become the norm.
5
Seth Eisenberg, Public Officers and Employees - General Provisions, 24 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 309, 311–13; 216–17 (2007); see also 2005 Ga. H.B. 665; 2007 Ga. H.B. 16. The
statute was further amended in 2009 and 2011 to reflect administrative changes to certain
administrative agencies in the state. See 2009 Ga. S.B. 97; 2011 Ga. H.B. 642.
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Part V will provide the author’s recommendation for amendment to the
GWA. Finally, Part VI will briefly conclude.

II. GWA: THE BASICS
A. The Statute
The GWA is divided into six subsections, labeled (a)-(f). Subsection (a)
provides definitions for various terms used in the statute. The definitions
will only be recited here as they become relevant to explain other
provisions of the GWA. Two definitions, however, are important from the
beginning: “public employer” and “public employee.”
The GWA defines a “public employer” as:
[T]he executive, judicial, or legislative branch of the state; any
other department, board, bureau, commission, authority, or other
agency of the state which employs or appoints a public employee
or public employees; or any local or regional governmental entity
that receives any funds from the State of Georgia or any state
agency.6
Section (a)(3) provides:
‘Public employee’ means any person who is employed by the
executive, judicial, or legislative branch of the state or by any
other department, board, bureau, commission, authority, or other
agency of the state. This term also includes all employees,
officials, and administrators of any agency covered by the rules of
the State Personnel Board and any local or regional governmental
entity that receives any funds from the State of Georgia or any
state agency.7
Subsection (b) of the GWA permits public employers to receive and
investigate complaints and report regarding possible “fraud, waste, and
abuse in or relating to any state programs and operations under the
6
7

O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(4).
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(3).
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jurisdiction of such public employer.”8 This subsection grants public
employers jurisdiction to handle complaints and investigations internally,
rather than having to involve the state government or law enforcement with
every report.9 But, “fraud, waste, and abuse” are not defined in the statute.
Subsection (c) provides for the confidentiality of public employees who
complain. The subsection does not specify whether it applies to all
complaints of fraud, waste, and abuse. As discussed below, the antiretaliation provision of subsection (d) is narrower than the jurisdictional
provision of (b). It is unclear where subsection (c) falls, and no case law
provides clarity. Presumably, subsection (c) applies to all reports under (b).
Subsection (d) is the anti-retaliation provision of the GWA. It provides:
(1) No public employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any policy or
practice preventing a public employee from disclosing a violation
of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a
supervisor or a government agency.
(2) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee
for disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or
regulation to either a supervisor or a government agency, unless
the disclosure was made with knowledge that the disclosure was
false or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.
(3) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee
for objecting to, or refusing to participate in, any activity, policy,
or practice of the public employer that the public employee has
reasonable cause to believe is in violation of or noncompliance
with a law, rule, or regulation.
(4) Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subsection shall not apply to
policies or practices which implement, or to actions by public
employers against public employees who violate, privilege or

8

O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(b).
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(b); see also Colon v. Fulton Cty., 751 S.E.2d 307, 311–12 (Ga.
2013).
9
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confidentiality obligations recognized by constitutional, statutory,
or common law.10
Several terms in subsection (d) are defined in subsection (a). “Law, rule
or regulation” means “any federal, state, or local statute or ordinance or any
rule or regulation adopted according to any federal, state, or local statute or
ordinance.”11 A “supervisor” is any person
(A) To whom a public employer has given authority to direct and
control the work performance of the affected public employee;
(B) To whom a public employer has given authority to take
corrective action regarding a violation of or noncompliance with a
law, rule or regulation of which the public employee complains; or
(C) Who has been designated by a public employer to receive
complaints regarding a violation of or noncompliance with a law,
rule, or regulation.12
“Government agency” means any agency of federal, state, or local
government charged with the enforcement of laws, rules, or regulations.13
Finally,
“Retaliate” or “retaliation” refers to the discharge, suspension, or
demotion by a public employer of a public employee or any other
adverse employment action taken by a public employer against a
public employee in the terms or conditions of employment for
disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or
regulation to either a supervisor or government agency.14
Subsections (e) and (f) provide the right of action, jurisdictional
limitation, statute of limitations, and remedies for whistleblowers. Actions
under the GWA cannot be brought in a magistrate court or state court; they

10
11
12
13
14

O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d).
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(2).
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(6).
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(1).
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(5).
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must be brought in superior court.15 The statute of limitations is one year
after discovery of the retaliation, with a three-year statute of repose.16 The
remedies for a successful public employee include: an injunction restraining
continued violations; reinstatement to the same or an equivalent position;
reinstatement of fringe benefits and seniority; lost wages, benefits, and
other remuneration; compensatory damages; and reasonable attorney’s fees,
costs, and expenses.17
B. The GWA Prior to 2015
Prior to 2015, the exact framework for analyzing GWA claims was
unclear. Unofficially, courts used the federal McDonnell Douglas
framework for analyzing cases.18
Under the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff
must first create an inference of discrimination through his prima
facie case. Once the plaintiff has made out the elements of the
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
non-discriminatory basis for its employment action. If the
employer meets this burden, the inference of discrimination drops
out of the case entirely, and the plaintiff has the opportunity to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered
reasons were pretextual. Where the plaintiff succeeds in
discrediting the employer’s proffered reasons, the trier of fact may
conclude that the employer intentionally discriminated.19
To show a prima facie case of retaliation under the GWA, a plaintiff had
to show that:

15

O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4-(e)(1).
Id.
17
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(e)(2)–(f).
18
Forrester v. Georgia Dep’t of Human Servs., 708 S.E.2d 660, 665–66 (Ga. Ct. App.
2011) (physical precedent only). But see Freeman v. Smith, 750 S.E.2d 739, 741–42 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2013) (declining to formally adopt the McDonnell Douglas framework).
19
Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767–68 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotations omitted).
16
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(1) the employer falls under the statute’s definition of a ‘public
employer’; (2) the employee disclosed a violation of or
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor
or government agency; (3) the employee was then discharged,
suspended, demoted, or suffered some other adverse employment
decision by the public employer; and (4) there is some causal
relation between (2) and (3).20
For the sake of brevity, the first element will be referred to as coverage, the
second as protected activity, the third as an adverse action, and the fourth as
causation. While early GWA litigation focused on coverage, these cases
became irrelevant after the statute was amended to increase the scope of
public

employers

and

public

employees.21

Following

the

GWA

amendments, coverage ceased being a serious issue in litigation, with one
exception that will be discussed in Part III.22
As mentioned above, the anti-retaliation provision of the GWA protects
reports of or objections to “violation[s] of or noncompliance with a law,
rule, or regulation,” while the jurisdictional section covers reports of “fraud,
waste, or abuse.”23 The anti-retaliation provision is narrower in scope.
Reporting theft by employees from the employer was protected.24 But
reporting embezzlement by an employee at a prior employer was not
protected.25 Reporting general safety concerns was also not protected.26
Reporting personal concerns intended to get help for a troubled friend and

20

Forrester, 708 S.E.2d at 666.
See, e.g., N. Ga. Reg’l Educ. Serv. Agency v. Weaver, 527 S.E.2d 864 (Ga. 2000); see
also Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 311–13, 316–17; 2005 Ga. H.B. 665; 2007 Ga. H.B. 16.
22
See, e.g., Forrester, 708 S.E.2d at 666–67 (physical precedent only).
23
Compare O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d), with O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a).
24
Jones v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 585 S.E.2d 138, 143 (Ga. Ct. App.
2003).
25
Brathwaite v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 729 S.E.2d 625, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
26
Edmonds v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 689 S.E.2d 352, 357 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2009).
21
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coworker also did not constitute protected activity.27 Objecting to conduct
that could amount to obstruction of justice, however, was protected.28
The statute provides that “discharge, suspension, [and] demotion” are
adverse actions.29 In Jones v. Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia, the Georgia Court of Appeals considered whether resigning in lieu
of termination (often referred to as “involuntary resignation”) constituted an
adverse action.30 The Jones court answered in the affirmative.31 While this
rule is still the general consensus, the Jones court based its reasoning—at
least in part—on language in a prior version of the GWA that prohibited
threatening action against an employee.32 That language was removed from
the statute with the 2005 amendment.33 When the issue seemed to reappear
in Albers v. Georgia Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia,
the Albers court held that giving an employee the option of resigning under
threat of termination did not constitute an adverse action for the purposes of
the statute of limitations where the employee did not resign and was not
terminated until months later.34 Because Albers did not specifically address
Jones or its reasoning, and because Jones has not been overruled by any
subsequent cases, Jones may still be good law despite the statutory
amendment.
The statute also mentions “other adverse employment action[s].”35 In
Freeman v. Smith, the Georgia Court of Appeals incorporated federal Title

27

Forrester 708 S.E.2d at 667–68.
Albers v. Georgia Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 766 S.E.2d 520, 523 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2014).
29
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(5).
30
Jones v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 585 S.E.2d 138, 143–44 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
2005 Ga. H.B. 665.
34
Albers v. Georgia Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 766 S.E.2d 520, 524–26
(Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
35
Id.
28
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VII cases to determine whether an action was “materially adverse.”36 Under
Title VII case law, an action is materially adverse if “a reasonable employee
would have found the challenged action materially adverse, meaning that it
might well have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making the
statutorily-protected disclosure.”37 Further, “The actionable employer
conduct must be ‘significant,’ rather than ‘trivial.”38

For example,

informing an employee that her subordinate is about to be transferred away
did not rise to the level of an adverse action.39 There is also confusion
regarding when a transfer is actionable due to a lack of case law and the
refusal of the General Assembly to include “transfer” in the statute after it
had been proposed.40
For the final prima facie element, indicia of causation included temporal
proximity between the protected activity and adverse action, a supervisor’s
reaction to the protected activity, and evidence of pretext.41 For temporal
proximity, the general rule was that an adverse action must accrue within
three months of the protected activity; delay beyond three months was
generally fatal to a claim.42 A GWA plaintiff could survive substantial
delay, however, if there was other evidence suggesting causation.43
After the employer articulated a legitimate non-retaliatory business
reason for the adverse action, the employee needed to show that the reason
was pretextual.44 The employee could show the reason was pretextual
36

Freeman v. Smith, 750 S.E.2d 739, 744 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 744 (citing Cobb v. City of Roswell, 533 Fed. Appx. 888, 896 (11th Cir. 2013)).
38
Id. (citing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67–68
(2006)).
39
Id.
40
See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 315–16, 318–19.
41
Jones v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 585 S.E.2d 138, 143–44 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003).
42
See Freeman v. Smith, 750 S.E.2d 739, 743 (2013); see also Albers v. Georgia Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 766 S.E.2d 520, 524 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
43
Albers, 766 S.E.2d at 524.
44
Forrester v. Georgia Dep’t of Human Servs., 708 S.E.2d 660, 666 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)
(physical precedent only).
37
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through direct evidence that contradicted the employer’s reason or
circumstantial evidence suggesting that the proffered reason was not the
actual reason for the adverse action.45 Circumstantial evidence of pretext
included inconsistencies in stated reasons for the adverse action, evidence
of reactions to protected activity, comparator evidence of similarly situated
employees who were treated differently, and close temporal proximity.46

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GWA CASE LAW
Since 2015, the appellate courts have trended towards declining
procedural hurdles for plaintiffs but increasing substantive requirements to
a level that has practically eliminated a GWA plaintiff’s chance of success.
As a result of recent cases, interpretation of the GWA has diverged from
prior case law so substantially that it is no longer effectual.
In Tuohy v. City of Atlanta, the Georgia Court of Appeals embraced the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.47 The Tuohy court,
however, confused several lawyers practicing in the area. Its discussion of
pretext was odd. The Tuohy court first quoted Bailey v. Stonecrest Condo
Association, for the following passage: “In discussing this issue, the
Georgia Supreme Court has held that pretext is established by a direct
showing that discriminatory reason more likely motivated the defendant or
by an indirect showing that the defendant’s explanation is not credible.”48
This was consistent with the pretext analysis used in Caldon.49
The Tuohy court then quoted an unreported Eleventh Circuit case for the
following proposition:

45

Caldon v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 715 S.E.2d 487, 490 (Ga. Ct. App.
2011).
46
Id. at 491.
47
Tuohy v. City of Atlanta, 771 S.E.2d 501, 504–05 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
48
Tuohy, 771 S.E.2d. at 506 (quoting Bailey v. Stonecrest Condo Ass’n, 696 S.E.2d 462,
468–69 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)).
49
Caldon, 715 S.E.2d. at 490.
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A reason is not pretextual unless it is shown both that the reason
was false, and that discrimination or retaliation was the real
reason. If the proffered reason is one that might motivate a
reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason head on
and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply
quarreling with the wisdom of that reason, or showing that the
decision was based on erroneous facts.50
This new test is virtually impossible to meet. It converts what was
previously an “or” into an “and.”

An employee must provide direct

evidence of retaliation and disprove whatever reason the employer concocts
after the employer has had time to search for a “legitimate” reason. The
idea that an employee must disprove every alleged reason for an adverse
action and prove that retaliation was the real reason in order to survive
summary judgment and get to trial makes no sense. Georgia is a strongly atwill jurisdiction.51 Georgia courts “typically adjudicate against employees
claiming

wrongful

discharge,

regardless

of

the

reason

for

the

52

termination.” Given this hostility, a GWA plaintiff can only see a jury if
the plaintiff can prove that they never engaged in any misconduct, never
experienced even a temporary performance decline, and never made a
single mistake. This standard is impossible to meet. Plaintiffs are left
hoping that their defendants’ lawyers make a mistake during the course of
investigation or litigation and provide only false accusations.
The chain of citations for the quote providing this new test leads to St.
Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, a Supreme Court case that dealt with the
issue of when a plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment, not when a

50

Tuohy, 771 S.E.2d. at 506 (quoting Tarmas v. Secretary of the Navy, 433 Fed. Appx.
754, 761 (11th Cir. 2011)).
51
Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 309–11.
52
Id. at 310.
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plaintiff survives a defendant’s motion for summary judgment.53 The Court
stated,
Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the
trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination,
and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such
rejection, no additional proof of discrimination is required. But the
Court of Appeals’ holding that rejection of the defendant’s
proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff disregards the
fundamental principal . . . that a presumption does not shift the
burden of proof, and ignores our repeated admonition that the Title
VII plaintiff at all times bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.54
The Tuohy court declined to choose between the two tests it provided,
stating that the plaintiff could not survive summary judgment under either.55
By providing this new test, however, the Tuohy court opened a veritable
Pandora’s box in trial courts, with government defendants claiming that the
new—significantly harsher—test applies.56 In at least one case, the author
could only argue—unsuccessfully—that the Tuohy court did not actually
create a new test, based on the court’s failure to apply the test.57 The
situation became even worse, however, when the Georgia Court of Appeals
confirmed the new test in Harris v. City of Atlanta.58
In the next published case from the Georgia Court of Appeals after
Tuohy, Franklin v. Eaves, GWA plaintiffs received some good news.59 In
Franklin, the plaintiff stated at summary judgment that the first act of
retaliation against her (the removal of some of her job duties) occurred on
53
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (2013). The Tuohy court quoted
Tarmas v. Sec’y of the Navy, 433 Fed. Appx. 754, 761 (11th Cir. 2011), which cited
Brooks v. Cty. Comm’n, 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006), which quoted St. Mary’s.
54
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
55
Tuohy v. City of Atlanta, 771 S.E.2d 501, 506–07 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
56
Due to confidentiality concerns, the author is unable to provide specific trial court
citations. This assertion is based on experience in GWA litigation.
57
The author is unable to disclose the case citation due to confidentiality concerns.
58
Harris v. City of Atlanta, 813 S.E.2d 420, 424 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
59
Franklin v. Eaves, 787 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
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August 27, 2012.60 Additional acts of retaliation were alleged to have
occurred on October 12, 2012, October 17, 2012, December 2012, January
25, 2013, and June 2013.61 The plaintiff filed her GWA claim on October
11, 2013, more than one year from the first act of retaliation.62 The trial
court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the grounds that the
action was past the one-year statute of limitations.63
On appeal, Franklin argued that she did not learn of the August and
October actions until October 24, 2012, which was within one year of her
filing.64 The court allowed this argument to succeed, stating that Franklin
was not required to argue that she did not discover the retaliation until later
when the defendant bore the burden of proving that the action was filed late
and relied solely on a limited admission that the first act of retaliation
actually occurred prior to October 11, 2012.65 The Franklin court also
adopted provisions of federal law that state that each discrete adverse action
is independently actionable and carries its own statute of limitations.66
Following Franklin were a pair of plaintiff-friendly cases. In West v. City
of Albany, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia faced a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on a failure to
provide the city with ante litem notice pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5.67
The district court, unsure whether ante litem notice was required in GWA
cases, certified the question to the Georgia Supreme Court.68 At roughly the
same time, in Riggins v. City of Atlanta, the Fulton County Superior Courts

60

Id. at 269.
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Franklin, 787 S.E.2d 270. The date of discovery was apparently in the evidence at the
trial court, but was not argued until the appeal. Id. at 268–71.
65
Id. at 271.
66
Id. at 270–71 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114
(2002)).
67
West v. City of Albany, 797 S.E.2d 809, 810 (Ga. 2017).
68
Id.
61

VOLUME 19 • ISSUE 1 • 2020

133

134 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

dismissed a complaint based upon the failure to provide ante litem notice
under O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5.69
The municipal ante litem requirement states in part:
(a) No person, firm, or corporation having a claim for money
damages against any municipal corporation on account of injuries
to person or property shall bring any action against the municipal
corporation for such injuries, without first giving notice as
provided in the Code section.
(b) Within six months of the happening of the event upon which a
claim against a municipal corporation is predicated, the person,
firm, or corporation having the claim shall present the claim in
writing to the governing authority of the municipal corporation for
adjustment, stating the time, place, and extent of the injury, as
nearly as practicable, and the negligence which caused the injury.
No action shall be entertained by the courts against the municipal
corporation until the cause of action therein has first been
presented to the governing authority for adjustment.70
The Georgia Court of Appeals had previously ruled that the state ante
litem notice requirement did not apply to GWA claims, which could
independently effect a waiver of sovereign immunity.71 Given the precedent
set by Tuttle and the clear references to negligence in the municipal statute,
this pair of cases surprised many in the practice who assumed that the ante
litem statutes applied to torts, not the GWA. Luckily, the Georgia Supreme
Court ruled that the municipal ante litem requirement did not apply to the
GWA.72 The Georgia Court of Appeals soon followed the rule set by West
and reversed the Fulton County Superior Court’s dismissal of the Riggins
GWA claim.73

69

Riggins v. City of Atlanta, 798 S.E.2d 730, 730–31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5.
71
Tuttle v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 756 S.E.2d 585, 589 (Ga. Ct. App.
2014).
72
West, 797 S.E.2d at 814.
73
Riggins, 798 S.E.2d. at 730–31.
70
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After a few helpful decisions, the decision in Coward v. MCG Health,
Inc. dashed the plaintiffs’ hopes.74 In Coward, the employer terminated two
nurses for allegedly complaining that chronic short-staffing nearly led to a
psychiatric patient’s suicide.75 At summary judgment, the defendant argued
that the plaintiffs had only reported and objected to general safety concerns,
which are not protected.76 But there was a complication. While preparing
the response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiffs’ attorney discovered that the chronic short-staffing, if true, did
violate a law, rule, or regulation.77
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding that
the plaintiffs had not engaged in protected activity.78 On appeal, the
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed.79 The court qualified its ruling by
saying, “[i]n reaching this conclusion, we need not determine what
terminology is required to trigger the protections of the Whistleblower
Statute, nor do we believe that the statute requires specific magic words.”80
But the court was clear that an employee must allege and disclose that the
employer is violating a law, rule, or regulation prior to termination.81
This new rule is devastating for GWA plaintiffs. Requiring employees to
identify a law, rule, or regulation prior to termination shrinks the pool of
potentially successful plaintiffs to those with legal training. Based on the
author’s experience as an employment litigator, the chances of an average
74

Coward v. MCG Health, Inc., 802 S.E.2d 396 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
Id. at 397–98.
76
Id. at 399–400; see also Edmonds v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 689
S.E.2d 352, 357 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
77
The court does not specifically state this, but it said, “Coward did not allege that MCG
Health violated a law, rule, or regulation until she filed her response to MCG Health’s
motion for summary judgment.” Coward, 802 S.E.2d at 400. The court also stated,
“Bargerorn, like Coward, did not disclose a violation or failure to comply with any law,
rule, or regulation prior to her termination.” Id.
78
Id. at 397.
79
Id. at 401.
80
Coward, 802 S.E.2d. at 400.
81
Id. at 400.
75
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employee knowing the law is beyond slim. Coward presents a common
scenario: one in which an employee reports something wrong, gets fired,
and then hires an attorney, who must then determine whether the report was
sufficient. The statutory scheme covers the lack of legal knowledge on the
part of the general populace. The provision of the GWA that protects
disclosures protects them so long as they are not “made with knowledge
that the disclosure is false or with reckless disregard for its truth or
falsity.”82 The objection provision covers objections and refusals to
participate in any practice the employee “has reasonable cause to believe is
in violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation.”83
The next GWA case to come out of the Georgia Court of Appeals was
Murray-Obertein v. Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign
Finance Commission.84 In Murray-Obertein, the Georgia Court of Appeals
resurrected an old question: Who is covered by the GWA? The issue in
Murray-Obertein was whether former employees are protected from
retaliation.85 After a dispute with her employer ended in settlement, the
Executive Secretary of Murray-Obertein’s employer began making
derogatory comments about her to the media.86
Murray-Obertein looked to recent cases solidifying the relationship
between the GWA and federal retaliation law under Title VII; she then
argued that the rule in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. should apply.87 The
Robinson Court held that Title VII protected former employees from
retaliation.88 Even though it reaffirmed acceptance of the federal McDonnell

82

O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(2).
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(3).
84
Murray-Obertein v. Ga. Gov’t Transparency and Campaign Fin. Comm’n, 812 S.E.2d
28 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
85
Id. at 29.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 30 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
88
Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346.
83
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Douglas framework, the Georgia Court of Appeals declined to follow
federal cases for former employees.89
The Murray-Obertein decision harms plaintiffs, who suffer substantial
disadvantages finding new jobs and often have to leave their profession or
industry entirely.90 This decision results in a near absence of protections for
(1) bad references that are misleading but do not rise to the level of
defamation; (2) statements to licensing agencies regarding the plaintiff’s
termination; (3) statements to the media designed to harm the plaintiff’s
reputation; and (4) pension denials when the pensions are not governed by
ERISA.
The next GWA case to come before the Georgia Court of Appeals was
the return of Franklin v. Eaves,91 this time named Franklin v. Pitts.92 After
the case returned to the trial court, the court granted summary judgment to
the defendant.93 It ruled that: (1) the plaintiff failed to establish protected
activity; (2) all but two alleged adverse actions did not rise to the level of
adverse actions; (3) the plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection
between the alleged protected activity and the alleged adverse actions; and
(4) the plaintiff failed to establish pretext for the two accepted adverse
actions.94 The court only considered rulings (2) and (4).95
The trial court counted two transfer/promotion opportunity denials as
adverse actions.96 The court did not count a third job opportunity as an
adverse action because the plaintiff provided “no evidence showing that the

89

Murray-Obertein, 812 S.E.2d. at 30–31.
See Leora F. Eisenstadt & Jennifer M. Pacella, Whistleblowers Need Not Apply, 55
AM. BUS. L.J. 665, 666–669 (2018) (detailing stories of whistleblowers).
91
See supra nn.57–64.
92
Franklin v. Pitts, 826 S.E.2d 427, 430 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). The defendant’s name was
changed because the chairman of the Fulton County Board of Commissioners—who was
sued in his official capacity—changed. See id.
93
Id. at 430–31.
94
Id. at 431–32.
95
See id. at 439.
96
Id. at 432.
90
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County denied her a specific transfer opportunity.”97 The remaining
potential adverse actions were: “delaying a request to attend a training
session; change of job duties from credentialing providers and credit card
processing to electronic funds transfer duties; [and] denial of leave requests
and requests for documentation of leave.”98
The court had to decide whether these counted as adverse actions, and the
court framed the discussion around whether to adopt the Title VII standard
for substantive discrimination or for retaliation.99 The court noted that the
Eleventh Circuit has described the federal retaliation standard as “materially
adverse,” while referring to the substantive discrimination standard as
“serious and material change in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment.”100 Which standard would apply was decisive; similar adverse
actions were covered in the applicable federal case, Burlington Northern
and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White.101
In Burlington North, the plaintiff—the sole female employee in her
department—complained that her supervisor was making sexual and
discriminatory comments to and about her.102 The supervisor was punished,
but—later that same month and during the same meeting wherein the
plaintiff was informed of the supervisor’s discipline—the plaintiff’s
employer told her that she was being moved from operating a forklift to

97

Id. at 432 n.3.
Id.
99
Id. at 433–34.
100
Id. at 434 (citing Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 974 n.14 (11th Cir. 2008).
101
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). For those who are
new to employment law, please note that the Georgia Court of Appeals referred to the
Burlington North standard as the “Burlington standard.” See Pitts, 826 S.E.2d 427 at 43435. Practitioners in the area are familiar with a Burlington North standard, which is
discussed here, and a separate Burlington standard, which concerns sexual harassment
and comes from the case Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). For
the author’s sanity, this paper will use the industry norm and refer to the “Burlington
North standard.”
102
Burlington North, 548 U.S. at 57–58.
98
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general laborer tasks.103 After the plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, her employer charged her with
insubordination and suspended her pay.104 Although the plaintiff
experienced thirty-seven days of suspension without pay, the suspension
was reversed through an internal grievance process, and she was awarded
backpay for the thirty-seven days, bringing her lost wages to $0.105
After comparing the statutory text of Title VII’s prohibition on
discrimination with the prohibition on retaliation, the Court concluded that
the prohibition on retaliation was broader than the prohibition on
discrimination.106 Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer –
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 107
Title VII’s prohibition on retaliation states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment, for an employment agency, or joint labormanagement committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to
103

Id. at 58.
Id.
105
Id. at 58–59.
106
Id. at 61–64.
107
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
104
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discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for
membership, because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter. 108
The Court then set forth the Burlington North standard, which is: “[A]
plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the
challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination.”109 Reassignments and suspensions, even when
the employee suffers no loss of pay or status, can act as a deterrent or serve
as a symbolic punishment.110 These actions are, therefore, actionable in
retaliation cases.111 This standard was used in Freeman v. Smith, as detailed
in the prior section.112
Faced with similar adverse actions, the Georgia Court of Appeals took
the same basic approach: they compared the text of the GWA with the antidiscrimination and anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII.113 Concluding
that the GWA’s language is closer to Title VII’s anti-discrimination
provision, the court concluded that the Burlington North standard is not
appropriate for GWA cases.114 The court then adopted the stricter “serious
and material change in terms, conditions or privileges of employment,” and
found that the challenged adverse actions did not rise to the necessary level
to be actionable under the GWA.115

108

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Burlington North, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotations omitted).
110
Id. at 70–73.
111
Id.
112
Freeman v. Smith, 750 S.E.2d 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); see supra nn.34–38.
113
Franklin v. Pitts, 826 S.E.2d 427, 433–35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
114
Id. at 434–35.
115
Id. at 437–38.
109
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Turning to the remaining adverse actions—the denial of two
transfers/promotions—the court reaffirmed the Tuohy and Harris standard
of pretext.116 Because of the harshness of this standard, the plaintiff was
unable to show pretext, and the grant of summary judgment was
affirmed.117
Adopting the anti-discrimination standard instead of the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII may have been an appropriate textual analysis, but it
defeated the purposes of the GWA, which is an anti-retaliation statute. The
Burlington North standard focuses on deterrence, which is the point of an
anti-retaliation statute.118 By allowing employers to “make an example of”
an employee in an open act of hostility that falls short of the harsher antidiscrimination statute, the employer can deter employees and prevent
reports of misconduct, all without ramification.
An additional development is currently working its way through the
courts, though it has not yet led to an opinion.119 At least one large public
employer has attempted to argue for the judicial adoption of what is known
as the “employee duty rule.” This rule comes from litigation under the
federal WPA prior to the adoption of the WPEA, which overruled those
cases.120
The employee duty rule states that an employee does not engage in
protected activity when the employee reports something within the scope of
that employee’s ordinary job duties.121 Under this rule, a compliance officer
116

Id. at 438.
Id. at 438–39.
118
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006).
119
Due to confidentiality concerns, the author is unable to provide citations to cases, but
the author has seen this development arise multiple times.
120
Ann C. Hodges & Justin Pugh, Crossing the Thin Blue Line: Protecting Law
Enforcement Officers Who Blow the Whistle, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 1, 27
(2018); Heidi Kitrosser, On Public Employees and Judicial Buck-Passing: The
Respective Roles of Statutory and Constitutional Protections for Government
Whistleblowers, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1699, 1708 (2019).
121
Wolf v. Pac. Nat’l Bank, No. 09-21531, 2010 WL 5888778, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 28,
2010) (collecting cases).
117
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would not be protected by the GWA because the compliance officer’s job is
to find and report violations of laws, rules, and regulations. At the federal
level, Congress passed the WPEA to overturn this rule.122 State
whistleblower laws, however, are often unclear because they do not provide
or prohibit an employee duty rule.123 Georgia is one of these states; it does
not provide or prohibit the rule in its whistleblower statute.124 In the
author’s experience, Georgia trial courts have been unwilling to weigh in on
the employee duty rule, instead relying on the cases referenced above to
dismiss cases and avoid the discussion.
The employee duty rule is likely to make its way to the Georgia Court of
Appeals at some point, and, if adopted, it will be disastrous for public
whistleblowers in Georgia. The employee duty rule is particularly
dangerous in light of Coward. The employees who are likely to know which
law is being broken and identify a violated law, rule, or regulation for their
employer are probably the ones whose job duties specifically involve
reporting violations of that law, rule, or regulation. They likely received
training on the law, rule, or regulation because it is their job to find and
report potential violations. Employees who see that something is wrong, but
are not sure what, will run into the Coward rule. Employees who are trained
and experienced at spotting violations will run into the employee duty rule.
Either way, there will be no protection, and the GWA will be nearly
useless.

IV. FEDERAL EMPLOYEE WHISTLEBLOWER LAW
As shown above, Georgia courts have compared the GWA to Title VII
and made GWA cases more difficult for plaintiffs than Title VII cases. For
122

Samantha Arrington Sliney, Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean: The
Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Application of Whistleblower Protection Laws to
Disclosures Made Contrary to Transportation Security Administration Regulations, 8
N.E. U. L.J. 397, 400 (2016).
123
See Hodges & Pugh, supra note 117, at 27.
124
See generally O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4.
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federal employee whistleblowers, however, the applicable law is the
Whistleblower Protection Act.125 Copying the federal WPA in its entirety is
likely not the solution for the problems facing the GWA, but some parts of
the WPA can provide useful inspiration for how the problems with the
GWA may be addressed.
Although whistleblower protections at the federal level can be traced
back to 1778,126 the modern iteration was first enacted within the 1978 Civil
Service Reform Act.127 In 1989, Congress unanimously passed the current
WPA.128 As amended in 1994 and again with the passage of the WPEA in
2012,129 the WPA protects most employees and applicants of the federal
Executive Branch and the Government Printing Office.130 It also protects
former employees.131
The WPA does not use the McDonnell Douglas framework; instead, it
uses a different framework. The plaintiff must first prove—by a
preponderance of the evidence—his or her prima facie case by showing
(1) the acting official had the authority to take any personnel
action; (2) the aggrieved employee made a protected disclosure;
(3) the acting official used his authority to take or refuse to take, a

125

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
Connor Berkebile, Note, The Puzzle of Whistleblower Protection Legislation:
Assembling the Piecemeal, 28 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2018).
127
See Sliney, supra note 120, at 399.
128
Id. at 399–400.
129
See id. at 400; see also Pub. L. No. 112–199.
130
The WPA excludes employees who are “excepted from the competitive service
because of [their job’s] confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policyadvocating character.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B)(i). Certain positions may also be
excluded from coverage by an Executive Order of the President, but the exclusion cannot
come after the adverse personnel action. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B)(ii). Additionally, the
WPA excludes from coverage employees involved in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii). Although employees of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation are listed in the excluded category, they are covered separately,
with specific requirements concerning how reports are made. 5 U.S.C. § 2303.
131
5 U.S.C. § 1221.
126
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personnel action; and (4) the protected disclosure was a
contributing factor in the agency’s personnel action.132
The first element is important because of how adverse actions work under
the WPA. Because it is tied to the adverse action prong (element (3) above),
the two will be discussed together.
An adverse action under the WPA is when an employee “take[s] or fail[s]
to take, or threaten[s] to take or fail to take, a personnel action” against a
covered employee or applicant.133 The list of “personnel action[s]” is long,
comprising twelve numbered items, only one of which covers traditional
adverse actions like suspension, demotion, and removal.134 The WPA
covers actions such as temporary details,135 performance evaluations,136 and
the implementation or enforcement of nondisclosure policies or
agreements.137 Authority to take the action matters both because the list of
actions is broad and because threats to take an action are also covered.138
The first element, when added to the third, ensures that the adverse action is
genuine.
For the second element, protected activity, the WPA protects employees
and applicants who disclose information they reasonably believe shows:
(i) any violation of any law, rule or regulation, or
(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety, if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and
if such information is not specifically required by Executive order

132

King v. Dep’t of the Army, 570 Fed. Appx. 863, 865 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing
Chambers v. Dep’t of the Interior, 602 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
133
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
134
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 7502, 7512.
135
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iv).
136
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(viii).
137
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xi).
138
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
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to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct
of foreign affairs.139
The WPA also protects:
any disclosure to the Special Counsel, or to the Inspector General
of an agency or another employee designated by the head of the
agency to receive such disclosures, of information which the
employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences –
(i) any violation (other than a violation of this section) of any law,
rule, or regulation, or
(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety.140
The distinction between the two provisions stems from the fact that a
disclosure need not be to internal authorities or law enforcement; a
disclosure can be made to the media, so long as the disclosure is not
prohibited by law.141
Disclosures can be formal or informal,142 may be made directly to a
supervisor or the person alleged to be committing—or attempting to
commit—a violation,143 need not be made in writing or while the employee
was on duty,144 and are still protected if made during the normal course of
an employee’s duties.145 A disclosure is protected even when the employee
has an impure motive in making it.146 The WPA also has a participation
clause, which protects employees who “exercise . . . any appeal, complaint,

139

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B).
141
See, e.g., Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 574 U.S. 383, 917 (2014); Chambers
v. Dep’t of the Interior, 602 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
142
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(D).
143
5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(1)(A).
144
5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(1)(D)-(E).
145
5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2).
146
5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(1)(C).
140
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or grievance right;”147 testify or lawfully assist someone else in exercising
an appeal, complaint, or grievance right;148 or cooperate with an
investigation.149 Finally, the WPA has an objection clause to protect
employees who refuse to obey an order that would violate a law, rule, or
regulation.150
The WPA sets out a statutory list of factors to be considered for
causation using the contributing factor standard.151 The statutory factors to
consider are: “(A) the official taking the personnel action knew of the
disclosure or protected activity; and (B) the personnel action occurred
within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that
the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the
personnel action.”152 “The words ‘a contributing factor’ . . . mean any factor
which, alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way
the outcome of the decision.”153 This standard is much more lenient towards
employees than the normal standards, such as the McDonnell Douglas
framework, which require proof that the “protected conduct was a
‘significant,’ ‘motivating,’ ‘substantial,’ or ‘predominant’ factor.”154
Once the employee proves their prima facie case, the burden shifts back
to the employer, who must do more than merely articulate an alleged reason
for the action; it must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have taken the same action in the absence of protected activity.155 The
factors to consider when deciding whether an agency has satisfied its

147

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A).
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B).
149
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C).
150
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D).
151
5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1).
152
Id.
153
Marano v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original)
(collecting legislative history of the WPA).
154
Id. at 1140.
155
5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); see also Marano, 2 F.3d at 1141.
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burden are known as the Carr factors,156 from Carr v. Social Security
Administration.157 The Carr factors are as follows:
(1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its
personnel action; (2) the existence and strength of any motive to
retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in
the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar
actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are
otherwise similarly situated.158
The requirement that the government prove its case by clear and convincing
evidence was deliberate, as indicated by the following quote on the
Congressional record:
“Clear and convincing evidence” is a high burden of proof for the
Government to bear. It is intended as such for two reasons. First,
this burden of proof comes into play only if the employee has
established by a preponderance of the evidence that the
whistleblowing was a contributing factor in the action – in other
words, that the agency action was tainted. Second, this heightened
burden of proof required of the agency also recognizes that when it
comes to proving the basis for an agency’s decision, the agency
controls most of the cards – the drafting of the documents
supporting the decision, the testimony of witnesses who
participated in the decision, and the records that could document
whether similar personnel actions have been taken in other cases.
In these circumstances, it is entirely appropriate that the agency
bear a heavy burden to justify its actions.159
Congress has also used this type of burden shifting in cases under the
Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act,160 the Energy Reorganization

156

See, e.g., Whitmore v. Dep’t of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
158
Id. at 1323 (numbering added).
159
135 Cong. Rec. H747–48 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989); see also Whitmore, 680 F.3d at
1367 (quoting the same passage).
160
15 U.S.C. § 2087; see, e.g., Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 114 (2nd Cir. 2019).
157
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Act,161 the Federal Railroad Safety Act,162 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.163
This burden shifting is significantly more employee friendly than the
McDonnell Douglas framework, but there are solid reasons for adopting it
in actions against the government.
If the employee wins their case, they are entitled to “corrective action.”164
“Corrective action” may include reinstatement to the same or a similar
position, back pay and benefits, medical costs, travel expenses,
consequential damages, and compensatory damages.165

A prevailing

employee, former employee, or applicant is entitled to attorney fees and
litigation costs.166 These remedies are similar to those in the GWA.167

V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The first available solution to the recent court decisions eviscerating the
GWA is for the Georgia Supreme Court to begin to take GWA cases again
and overrule the Georgia Court of Appeals. All the recent cases discussed
above have been decided at the court of appeals. For some reason, the
Georgia Supreme Court is not weighing in on the problem. Assuming the
Georgia Supreme Court does not intend to overrule the Georgia Court of
Appeals, it will be up to the Georgia General Assembly to amend the GWA.
Keeping with the order in which this paper introduced the GWA, the
following areas require amendment: (A) coverage; (B) protected activity;
(C) adverse action; and (D) causation and burden shifting. A full copy of
the suggested amended version of the GWA is included in Appendix A.

161

42 U.S.C. § 5851; see, e.g., Sanders v. Energy Nw., 812 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir.
2016).
162
49 U.S.C. § 20109; see, e.g., Pan Am Railways, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 855 F.3d
29, 36 (1st Cir. 2017).
163
18 U.S.C. § 1514A; see, e.g., Harp v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 558 F.3d 722, 723 (7th
Cir. 2009).
164
5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1).
165
5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(1)(A).
166
5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(1)(B); 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(2).
167
See supra note 14.
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A. Coverage
The problem that has developed regarding coverage is the lack of
protection for former employees.168 The clearest solution is to amend the
definition of “public employee” at O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(3). The suggested
language would read:
(3) “Public employee” means any person who is employed by the
executive, judicial, or legislative branch of the state or by any
other department, board, bureau, commission, authority, or other
agency of the state. This term also includes all employees,
officials, and administrators of any agency covered by the rules of
the State Personnel Board and any local or regional governmental
entity that receives any funds from the State of Georgia or any
state agency. This term also includes former public employees and
applicants for public employment.
“[A]pplicants for public employment” was added to address a scenario
where a public employer tells a former employee’s prospective new
employer about the employee’s protected activity and ruins the employee’s
chance of getting a new job. In the absence of a confidentiality agreement
or the above amended language, the former employer would not be liable in
this scenario.169
The above suggested language would likely require some additional
language in the protected activity section to prevent protection for activities
outside the scope of government operations. Those edits will be addressed
in the next section.

168

See supra nn. 81–86.
See Murray-Obertein v. Ga. Gov’t Transparency and Campaign Fin. Comm’n, 812
S.E.2d 28, 30-31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018); see also O.C.G.A. § 34-1-4. If O.C.G.A. § 45-14(c) is amended or interpreted to protect reports under subsection (d), then there would
be an argument for liability for the former employer, but this is unlikely to happen. See
supra p. 7 (discussion of subsections (b) and (c)).
169
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B. Protected Activity
The problems facing protected activity are the Coward rule170 and the
potential employee duty rule.171 Additionally, an amendment to the GWA
will be required if coverage is extended to former employees and
applicants. The three kinds of protected activity discussed are
disclosures,172 participation,173 and objections.174 The author recommends
adding a definition of these items to the definitions list in subsection (a) of
the GWA, which would then include the following items:
(7) “Protected activity” means any activity constituting a protected
disclosure, protected participation, or a protected objection.
Disclosures, participation, and objections are protected regardless
of whether the activity:
(A) is made or performed during the normal course of
duties of the public employee;
(B) is made to a supervisor or to a person who
participated in an activity that the public employee
reasonably believed to be covered by the protected
activity;
(C) reveals information that had been previously
disclosed;
(D) is made in writing; or
(E) is made or performed while the public employee is off
duty;
but disclosures and objections shall only constitute protected
activity if made while the public employee is employed by a public
employer.

170

See supra nn. 71–80
See supra nn. 116–120.
172
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(2); 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
173
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)-(C).
174
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(3); 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D).
171
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(8) “Protected disclosure” means a formal or informal
communication or transmission of information to a supervisor or
government agency by a public employee which the public
employee reasonably believes evidences:
(A) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or
(B) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety.
(9) “Protected participation” means:
(A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance
right granted by any law, rule, or regulation that concerns
or relates to retaliation under this Code section;
(B) testifying for or otherwise lawfully assisting any
individual in the exercise of any right referred to in
subparagraph (A);
(C) cooperating with or disclosing information in an
investigation, hearing, or court proceeding in connection
with protected activity under this Code section.
(10) “Protected objection” means objecting to, or refusing to
participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of the public
employer that the public employee has reasonable cause to believe
is in violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation.
The language for protected disclosures is taken directly from the WPA,
with a modification to keep the scope limited to reports to a supervisor or
government agency, as is the current limitation within the GWA.175
Language was added to ensure that disclosures and objections are only
protected if they occur while the employee is employed by a public
employer. This is designed to make sure that reports and objections must be
made to the public employer, but participation can happen after the
employee has left. This ensures that a prospective or former employee

175

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8); O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4.
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cannot gain protection (and a potential lawsuit) preemptively to increase his
or her chances of being hired or preventing a bad reference, while still
protecting

those

who

engage

in

legitimate

activities,

including

investigations, hearings, or court proceedings after the employee has left.
The fact that a disclosure is defined as “information constituting a
violation” should remove the Coward rule. The language in proposed
section (7)(A) is designed to foreclose the employee duty rule. Other added
language not specifically mentioned above is meant to track the WPA and
use clearer language to help resist judicial pushback against an amendment.
In an effort to provide uniformity throughout the GWA and apply the
confidentiality provision of subsection (c) to all reports, subsection (b)
should be amended as follows:
(b) A public employer may receive and investigate protected
disclosures complaints or information from any public employee
concerning the possible existence of any activity constituting
fraud, waste, and abuse in or relating to any state programs and
operations under the jurisdiction of such public employer.
In addition, subsections (B) and (C) from the definition of “supervisor”
should be amended as follows:
(B) To whom a public employer has given authority to take
corrective action regarding a protected disclosure by a violation of
or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation of which the
public employee complains; or
(C) Who has been designated by a public employer to receive
protected disclosures complaints regarding a violation of or
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation.
C. Adverse Action
The full scope of protected activity under the WPA is likely neither
necessary for the GWA nor likely to be passed in Georgia. Adopting the
Burlington North standard should be sufficient. The best way to do so is to
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amend the definition of “retaliation,” which would change subsection (a)(5)
to read as follows:
(5) “Retaliate” or “retaliation” refers to the discharge, suspension,
or demotion by a public employer of a public employee or any
other adverse employment action taken by a public employer
against a public employee that might dissuade a reasonable
employee from engaging in protected activity.in the terms or
conditions of employment for disclosing a violation of or
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor
or government agency.
To adopt this standard and harmonize subsection (d) with the other
changes presented, subsections (1) through (4) would be adjusted as
follows:
(1) No public employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any policy or
practice preventing a public employee from engaging in protected
activity. disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law,
rule, or regulation to either a supervisor or a government agency.
(2) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee
for engaging in protected activity. for disclosing a violation of or
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor
or a government agency, unless the disclosure was made with
knowledge that the disclosure was false or with reckless disregard
for its truth or falsity.
(3) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee
for objecting to, or refusing to participate in, any activity, policy,
or practice of the public employer that the public employee has
reasonable cause to believe in in violation of or noncompliance
with a law, rule, or regulation.
(4)(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2)(1), (2), and (3) of this subsection
shall not apply to policies or practices which implement, or to
actions by public employers against employees who violate,
privilege or confidentiality obligations recognized by
constitutional, statutory, or common law.
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D. Causation and Burden Shifting
Because of how the courts have handled burden shifting,176 the author
recommends switching to the WPA contributing factor test, which affects
causation and burden shifting together. To prevent shifting subsection
(e)(2), the following language—taken largely from the WPA,177 with some
language taken from the mixed motive language from Title VII178—would
be added:
(g)
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), in any case
under this Code section, the court shall order relief under
paragraphs (e) and (f) if the public employee has
demonstrated that protected activity was a contributing
factor in retaliation against the public employee by the
public employer, even though other factors also motivated
the adverse action. The public employee may demonstrate
that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the
personnel action through circumstantial evidence.
(2) Relief under paragraphs (e) and (f) may not be ordered
if, after a finding that protected activity was a
contributing factor, the public employer demonstrates by
clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken
the same adverse action in the absence of such protected
activity.

VI. CONCLUSION
Because Georgia courts are unwilling to enforce the GWA, the General
Assembly must act to protect taxpayers from unlawful acts by public
servants. This includes protecting those public employees who fulfill their
duty and report wrongdoing. By looking to federal whistleblower
protections, the General Assembly can address the recent court decisions
176

See supra nn. 44–55.
5 U.S.C. § 1221(e).
178
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
177
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that have eviscerated the GWA through an amendment. By incorporating
aspects of other functioning anti-retaliation laws, the language provided
within this article will overrule the recent judicial push-back against the
GWA while balancing the interests of the public, public employees, and
public employers.
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APPENDIX
The Amended GWA, O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4:
(a) As used in this Code section, the term:
(1) “Government agency” means any agency of federal, state, or
local government charged with the enforcement of laws, rules, or
regulations.
(2) “Law, rule, or regulation” includes any federal, state, or local
statute or ordinance or any rule or regulation adopted according to
any federal, state, or local statute or ordinance.
(3) “Public employee” means any person who is employed by the
executive, judicial, or legislative branch of the state or by any
other department, board, bureau, commission, authority, or other
agency of the state. This term also includes all employees,
officials, and administrators of any agency covered by the rules of
the State Personnel Board and any local or regional governmental
entity that receives any funds from the State of Georgia or any
state agency. This term also includes former public employees and
applicants for public employment.
(4) “Public employer” means the executive, judicial, or legislative
branch of the state; any other department, board, bureau,
commission, authority, or other agency of the state which employs
or appoints a public employee or public employees; or any local or
regional governmental entity that receives any funds from the State
of Georgia or any state agency.
(5) “Retaliate” or “retaliation” refers to the discharge, suspension,
or demotion by a public employer of a public employee or any
other adverse employment action taken by a public employer
against a public employee that might dissuade a reasonable
employee from engaging in protected activity.in the terms or
conditions of employment for disclosing a violation of or
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor
or government agency.
(6) “Supervisor” means any individual:
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(A) To whom a public employer has given authority to
direct and control the work performance of the affected
public employee;
(B) To whom a public employer has given authority to
take corrective action regarding a protected disclosure by
a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or
regulation of which the public employee complains; or
(C) Who has been designated by a public employer to
receive protected disclosures complaints regarding a
violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or
regulation.
(7) “Protected activity” means any activity constituting a protected
disclosure, protected participation, or a protected objection.
Disclosures, participation, and objections are protected regardless
of whether the activity:
(A) is made or performed during the normal course of
duties of the public employee;
(B) is made to a supervisor or to a person who
participated in an activity that the public employee
reasonably believed to be covered by the protected
activity;
(C) reveals information that had been previously
disclosed;
(D) is made in writing; or
(E) is made or performed while the public employee is off
duty;
but disclosures and objections shall only constitute protected
activity if made while the public employee is employed by a public
employer.
(8) “Protected disclosure” means a formal or informal
communication or transmission of information to a supervisor or
government agency by a public employee which the public
employee reasonably believes evidences:
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(A) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or
(B) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety.
(9) “Protected participation” means:
(A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance
right granted by any law, rule, or regulation that concerns
or relates to retaliation under this Code section;
(B) testifying for or otherwise lawfully assisting any
individual in the exercise of any right referred to in
subparagraph (A);
(C) cooperating with or disclosing information in an
investigation, hearing, or court proceeding in connection
with protected activity under this Code section.
(10) “Protected objection” means objecting to, or refusing to
participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of the public
employer that the public employee has reasonable cause to believe
is in violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation.
(b) A public employer may receive and investigate protected disclosures
complaints or information from any public employee concerning the
possible existence of any activity constituting fraud, waste, and abuse in or
relating to any state programs and operations under the jurisdiction of such
public employer.
(c) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, such public employer
shall not after receipt of a complaint or information from a public employee
disclose the identity of the public employee without the written consent of
such public employee, unless the public employer determines such
disclosure is necessary and unavoidable during the course of the
investigation. In such event, the public employee shall be notified in writing
at least seven days prior to such disclosure.
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(d)
(1) No public employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any policy or
practice preventing a public employee from engaging in protected
activity disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law,
rule, or regulation to either a supervisor or a government agency.
(2) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee
for engaging in protected activity for disclosing a violation of or
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor
or a government agency, unless the disclosure was made with
knowledge that the disclosure was false or with reckless disregard
for its truth or falsity.
(3) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee
for objecting to, or refusing to participate in, any activity, policy,
or practice of the public employer that the public employee has
reasonable cause to believe in in violation of or noncompliance
with a law, rule, or regulation.
(4)(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2)(1), (2), and (3) of this subsection
shall not apply to policies or practices which implement, or to
actions by public employers against employees who violate,
privilege or confidentiality obligations recognized by
constitutional, statutory, or common law.
(e)
(1) A public employee who has been the object of retaliation in
violation of this Code section may institute a civil action in
superior court for relief as set forth in paragraph (2) of this
subsection within one year after discovering the retaliation or
within three years after the retaliation, whichever is earlier.
(2) In any action brought pursuant to this subsection, the court may
order any or all of the following relief:
(A) An injunction restraining continued violation of this
Code section;
(B) Reinstatement of the employee to the same position
held before the retaliation or to an equivalent position;
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(C) Reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority
rights;
(D) Compensation for lost wages, benefits, and other
remuneration; and
(E) Any other compensatory damages allowable at law.
(F) A court may award reasonable attorney’s fees, court
costs, and expenses to a prevailing public employee.
(g)
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), in any case under
this Code section, the court shall order relief under paragraphs (e)
and (f) if the public employee has demonstrated that protected
activity was a contributing factor in retaliation against the public
employee by the public employer, even though other factors also
motivated the adverse action. The public employee may
demonstrate that the protected activity was a contributing factor in
the personnel action through circumstantial evidence.
(2) Relief under paragraphs (e) and (f) may not be ordered if, after
a finding that protected activity was a contributing factor, the
public employer demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence
that it would have taken the same adverse action in the absence of
such protected activity.
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